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1 Introduction
This paper addresses deeper economic integration1 - the idea that regional integration, by
addressing institutional, nancial, regulatory and infrastructure issues using, for example,
harmonisation and mutual recognition agreements,2 can promote trade beyond what can
be attained by tari¤ removal alone. In particular, I analyse the likely impact of the recent
accession of several Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) to the European
Union. To this end, I derive estimates of aggregate border costs, including many of which
are not explicit trade barriers.3 These are inferred by comparing actual trade with that
predicted from country size and transport costs. The novel aspect is the use of a fully model-
consistent procedure for identifying such costs, by calibrating a multi-country Dixit-Stiglitz
general equilibrium model directly upon observed trade ows.
The conclusions are that trade patterns in 1997 are consistent with border costs between
the existing EU and accession states of between 0 and 33 per cent. If these barriers were
overcome by deeper economic integration, one might expect overall trade between these
areas to increase by 50-100 per cent, leading to gains in income of 10-20 per cent for the
accession states and small gains for the existing EU members. While the conclusions broadly
agree with previous studies, the implied gains are, if anything, somewhat more optimistic.
The layout of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the derivation and economic
role of border costs. Section 3 outlines the calibration and general equilibrium methodology,
especially the model-consistent calibration methodology, as well as the data used. In section
1See Lawrence, 1995.
2On mutual recognition, the most comprehensive reference is Maskus and Wilsons (2000) World Bank
study.
3e.g. the e¤ects of product standards, labelling and such like, and the associated application of testing
and border checks.
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4, I present results and compare them with previous studies. Section 5 concludes.
2 Border costs and the gains from the Single Market
Early studies of European integration, e.g. Brown et al (1995), concentrated on the removal
of tari¤s and formal non-tari¤ barriers (NTBs). These are relatively straightforward to
identify, although the precise nature of the simulation model (usually computable general
equilibrium (CGE)) will a¤ect estimates of gains and losses. However, most formal barriers
between the EU and the CEECs were removed in the mid 1990s by the Europe Agreements.
The issue has then moved to the e¤ects of CEEC accession to the Single Market, with its
associated mix of regulatory harmonisation and mutual recognition agreements, intended
to remove regulatory barriers to trade. Such barriers are hard to quantify, since national
regimes impose a complex mixture of technical and administrative costs.4
The literature on trade costs has recently been extensively covered by Anderson and
Van Wincoop (2004). I concentrate here on aspects pertinent to European enlargement,
and to the integration of trade costs into a general equilibrium model. Costs can be divided
into explicit tari¤ and non-tari¤ barriers and transport costs and the harder-to-identify
costs associated with product standards and border controls. These can be estimated by
bottom-upor top-downmethods. The former rely on surveying rms for technical data,
nding estimates of border queues and the like. This is by no means easy, although some
studies - e.g. Zahariadis (2002) - do make attempts at such measurement.5
4The articles in Maskus and Wilson (2000) are a good survey of the limited research carried out so far
on the economics of technical barriers to trade. Baldwins (2000) article in that book summarises the view
that these barriers comprise regulatory protection. Edwards (2003) gives a more cautionary view on this.
5Zahariadis (2002) looked at EU-Turkish integration, combining data on various costs from Harrison et
al (1996), Hoekman and Eby Konan (1998). Total estimated costs on Turkish imports into the EU were
below 5 % for most sectors, though there is also a standardisation cost (Harrison et al (1996)) of 1- 2.8 %
2
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2.1 Estimated gravity models
Studies such as LeJour et al (2001) or the literature surveyed in Anderson and Wincoop
(2004) derive costs by inference from trading patterns, using gravity models, on the grounds
that bottom-up estimates may miss many of the costs involved. If a pair of countries
trades much less than might normally be expected, then we might well infer that there
is some cost obstructing that trade. Tari¤s, NTBs and transport costs can be deducted,
leaving an estimate for the net e¤ect of regulations, currency conversion costs and even the
informational costs of nding trade partners where trade has been di¢ cult in the past (see
Rauch (1999), Edwards (2006)).
Trade is usually compared to an assumed underlying gravity framework, using equations
(in logs) for trade in good i between exporting country, c; and importing country, cc; of the
form:
Xi;c;cc = i + idic;cc + 1iYc + 2iYcc + i;c;cc; (1)
Xi;c;cc denotes exports, Y is GDP and d is distance between capitals of c and cc. Theory
suggests that trade should be roughly proportional to the product of country sizes and
inversely proportional to distance. Gravity models can be empirical or more theory-driven
(see Bergstrand (1989), Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003)).
While gravity equations usually work reasonably well for trade between large subsets of
countries, there is a clear mist in the case of the national borders of the importing country.
Trade within almost any country substantially exceeds than that with neighbouring coun-
tries, even after taking account of distance. This missing tradecan be very substantial6,
on Turkish exporters only,.
6Treer (1995), McCallum (1995).
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while the causes are controversial7.
Despite their intentions, the EU Single Market and introduction of the Single Currency
are far from eliminating home bias across member states. Nevertheless, there are also
limited regional bias e¤ects linked to the regional trade bloc border. These are potentially
particularly important when we come to analyse the impact of Single Market enlargement.
A fuller gravity model could therefore be written (in logs) as:
Xi;c;cc = i + 1iD
ijs
EU + 2idc;cc + 1iYc + 2iyc + 3iYcc + 4iycc + (2)X
d
dDdi;c;cc + 1iTMi;c;cc + v2iTEi;c;cc + i;c;cc
where Dd is a set of dummies for border e¤ects, with DEU set to 1 if both c and cc are
EU members, otherwise set to zero. TMi;c;cc is the tari¤ on imports of i from c to cc.
TEi;c;cc is the export tari¤ levied by country c on country cc. yc and ycc represent income
per capita, which can also be shown to have signicant e¤ects. In the LeJour et al (2001)
study, estimated trade between EU members in the late 1990s was between 0-250 % higher
than that between EU members and the CEECs.
2.1.1 Cost estimation
To estimate border costs, we also need estimates of demand and supply elasticities. Ideally,
these should be consistent with the estimated e¤ects of tari¤s and formal NTBs. In addition,
it is necessary to make an assumption whether border costs are xed or variable with respect
to trade. The standard response is to assume they are icebergcosts, which eat up a xed
7Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2000) argue that a combination of border regulatory costs, currency conversion
costs, informational costs and under-measurement of transport costs explains much of the di¤erence. Ander-
son and Van Wincoop (2003) argue that omitted variables and model-inconsistencies mean that McCallums
estimated border e¤ect is vastly overstated.
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proportion g;c;cc of the value of exports from c to cc. For example, Baldwin et al (1997) and
LeJour et al (2001) assume that non-membership of the Single Market imposes an iceberg
cost borne in the rst instance by the importer. This could be consistent with bureaucratic
or testing costs in the limited case where a xed proportion of goods imported have to be
tested, or with pure horizontalregulatory barriers (in the sense that di¤erent countries
rules specify di¤erent technical specications, but which have no tangible di¤erence in terms
of the quality of the good or service experienced by consumers).8 Unlike a tari¤, an iceberg
border cost yields no revenue: consequently its abolition gives a much greater boost to
overall incomes.
The above resource cost specication is open to challenge. Many trading costs (e.g. the
redesign of a good, or testing a variety just once to meet di¤erent standards), may impose a
lump-sum cost on importers. If producers are identical, then there will be a threshold level
of lump-sum cost of market entry. The resource cost of this may be greater or less than
that of an iceberg cost, depending upon elasticities and the scale of reduction in observed
trade volumes, but numerical analysis suggests that, if entry is seen to have been deterred,
the cost of a lump-sum barrier must be high.9
The idea that regulatory di¤erences are of the pure horizontalvariety is open to criti-
cism (see Edwards, 2003). Di¤erent standards may be better suited to the di¤erent natonal
tastes. Higher standards may raise consumer welfare, though at the expense of producers.
Despite these objections, I continue to use the iceberg cost assumption in this paper,
partly for consistency with previous studies and partly due to its relative simplicity of
8See, again, Maskus and Wilson (2001) or Edwards (2003) for more detail.
9The authors calculations indicate that, for a demand elasticity of 4, the threshold lump-sum entry cost
imposes a higher welfare loss than the iceberg trade cost consistent with a halving of trade volumes.
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implementation.
2.2 Specication of the simulation model
The most appropriate simulation tool for major trade changes is usually held to be a multi-
country, multi-sector CGE model. The neoclassical Heckscher-Ohlin model framework is
not seen as realistic, since it only allows for trade in one direction. The major alterna-
tives are the Armington formulation - a somewhat ad hoc model where producers within a
country are perfectly competitive, but di¤erent countriesgoods are di¤erentiated - and the
Dixit-Stiglitz (D-S) formulation, which is explicitly derived from a love-of-varietymodel
of consumer demand, and usually assumes Chamberlinian monopolistic competition in the
long run between producers of di¤erentiated varieties. Under many circumstances, both
the Armington and the D-S models share many behavioural properties (downward-sloping
demand curves, improvements in consumer utility from being able to spread demand across
a variety of sources), although the latter can also incorporate price mark-ups and potential
gains from capacity rationalisation (see Krugman, 1979, Baldwin and Venables, 1995).
Where inputs have a variety e¤ect and where transport costs are high, the D-S formulation
can result in agglomeration economies, making the model prone to multiple equilibria.
Of previous simulations of Eastward EU enlargement, LeJour et al (2001) used tted
coe¢ cients based upon a gravity model of trade and a multi-country Armington CGE model.
There was no guarantee of theoretical consistency between the tted gravity equations and
the simulation model. Baldwin et al (1997) utilised a D-S general equilibrium model,
but simply assumed that trade between EU members and non-members carried a (fairly
arbitrary) 10% iceberg cost. Zahariadis(2001) single-country on possible Turkish accession
utilised more conservative bottom-up estimates of border costs.
6
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3 Methodology of this study
In common with the top-downstudies summarised above, I derive implicit trade costs from
observed trade. However, unlike previous work, rather than estimating equations, I derive
residual border e¤ects by direct calibration of a theoretical D-S model (see below), which are
then fully consistent with the model used for simulation. I calibrate residual border e¤ects
for imports and exports between each pair of countries (constructing averages for intra-EU
trade by model-consistent CES aggregation). This compares to the more parsimonious set
of dummies used in most gravity studies, which constrain many residual border e¤ects to
be equal. I also use direct estimates of transport costs from the GTAP project, rather than
arc distances. In addition, compared to gravity estimation, more specic account is taken
of the importance of relative output prices, calibrating for revealed comparative costs on
the basis of a certain set of restrictive assumptions has been made about border e¤ects.10
3.1 Derivation of border and comparative production costs
The theoretical relationship between the D-S model and the gravity model is well-established
since Bergstrand (1989), and forms the basis for the calibration in this paper. Since the
calibration technique is novel, I outline it in detail. The subscript i is dropped throughout
this section. I assume goods are consumed in countries c 2 1:::C, which I also index as cc.
Imports of good g into country cc are Qg;cc. Total consumer utility in country cc is assumed
10 In the absence of better information, I have assumed these border costs are symmetrical in both directions
between a pair of countries. Note that the assumptions made about relative border e¤ects can potentially
a¤ect our picture of the underlying competitiveness of the CECs in di¤erent industries - further information
on this might help guide future work.
7
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to reect the function:
Ucc =
"X
c
X
g2c
((1  c;cc)Qg;cc)( 1)=
#=( 1)
; (3)
where  is the elasticity of substitution between goods varieties, and c;cc is an iceberg cost.
Setting the marginal utility of consumption of g equal to its relative price and rearranging:
Qg;cc = Ucc
h
(1  c;cc)( 1)=(cc=Pc(1 +  c;cc)(1 + tc;cc)
i
; (4)
where  c;cc is the proportionate transport cost and tc;cc is the net contribution of import
and export tari¤s, subsidies and the tari¤ equivalents of NTBs. Pc is the selling price of
goods from country c at the point of export, while cc is an aggregate consumer price index
for cc.
Next, rewrite (4) in terms of observable variables. The nominal value of exports from
c to cc, Ec;cc is the number of goods varieties produced in country c, nc, times sales per
good, Qg;cc(g 2 c) times the export price Pc, upscaled by (1 +  c;cc) to take account of the
transport cost . Ucc equals total expenditure in cc, Ycc divided by the aggregate price index
cc. nc equals output Xc, divided by the turnover of a representativerm, Tc. Hence
Ec;cc = (1  c;cc)( 1)XcYccT 1c P 1 c  1cc (1 +  c;cc)1 (1 + tc;cc)  (5)
For cc = c we can replace Ec;cc with Hcc (home use). For Hcc;  cc;cc = tcc;cc = 0. This
8
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means that, rearranging (5), and dividing by the version for Hcc gives us:
Ec;cc=Hcc = (1 c;cc)=(1 cc;cc))( 1)(Xc=Xcc)(Tcc=Tc)(Pc=Pcc)1 (1+ c;cc)1 (1+tc;cc) 
(6)
We can rearrange this to put (1 c;cc) on the left hand side, and if we assume c;cc = 0
for c = cc; we can simplify somewhat:
(1  c;cc) = f(Ec;cc=Hcc)(Xcc=Xc)(Tc=Tcc)(Pcc=Pc)1 (1 +  c;cc) 1(1 + tc;cc)g1=( 1): (7)
An interesting result is found if we multiply together these expressions for trade in both
directions between a pair of countries, c and cc, since a lot of terms can then be eliminated:
(1  c;cc)(1  cc;c) = h
q
~Ec;cc ~Ecc;cj
p
HcHcci2=(1 ); (8)
where the tilde represents adjustment for tari¤s, NTBs and transport costs. If the geometric
average volume of trade between a pair of countries, once tari¤s and transport costs have
been corrected for, is signicantly smaller than that of home-based consumption in the two
countries, then there must be residual border costs present. Assuming residual border trade
costs are the same in each direction, then
c;cc = 1  h
q
~Ec;cc ~Ecc;cj
p
HcHcci1=( 1): (9)
Once an estimated value for the elasticity of substitution,  has been chosen, all the
other terms on the right hand side of (8) are given, so that, for given observed output,
consumption and trade, the higher the value of the trade cost, c;cc, the lower will be the
implicit trade cost in the other direction, cc;c. We can therefore use data on observed trade
9
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ows a) between existing EU member states and b) between existing and future member
states (as well as that between pairs of future member states) to infer the cost-equivalence
of assumed regulatory barriers to trade.
3.2 The model for simulations
Simulations on the removal of these trade costs are carried out using a multi-country static
CGE model, as outlined in Appendix 1. Goods are produced using a Cobb-Douglas aggre-
gate of intermediate inputs and 4 primary factors: unskilled labour, skilled labour, capital
and land. Land is xed sectorally. Both types of labour are mobile between sectors, but not
internationally. For capital, I investigate two variants, one where it is xed in total within
a country, and one where it is internationally mobile.
Intermediate inputs and nal consumption goods are CES aggregates of home production
and imports from various sources. The elasticity of substitution between di¤erent sources
of a good is set at 4 in all sectors.11 This lies at the lower end of elasticity estimates
surveyed by Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004), which vary from 4 to 5 up to around 10.
However, it is more consistent with the elasticities traditionally used in Armington-based
general equilibrium models. A key factor may be time-scale (in this model I am interested
in medium-run simulations, where perhaps long-run elasticities would be higher).
There are also iceberg transport costs, iceberg unspecied trade costs (see above) and
tari¤s, as well as taxes/subsidies on output and use of a commodity.
Firms are imperfectly competitive, and charge markups dependent on their market
shares.Treatment of the number of rms within an industry and country is an issue here.
11The love of variety characteristic of the Dixit-Stiglitz model requires the substitution elasticity  > 1:
Note that the original Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) paper was written in terms of a substitution parameter,  =
(   1)=; which correspondingly has to lie in the range between zero and unity.
10
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Many D-S models assume that the number of rms is endogenous. Trade liberalisation
leads to a general shakeout of capacity (see Krugman, 1979). The small loss of consumer
variety from the shakeout is o¤set by a larger gain from allowing rms to reap economies
of scale (see Baldwin and Venables, 1995). However, endogenised rm numbers are really a
long-run assumption, since xed costs may not be avoidable in the short- or medium-run.
For this reason, I retain a medium-runformulation, with a xed number of rms in each
country/industry.
The top level of the consumption function uses a Cobb-Douglas structure.
3.3 Data
I use the GTAP version 5 database, which has harmonised trade and input-output data for
regions across the world in 1997. I aggregate data into 8 goods12 and 10 regions13, chosen
for their relevance to the issue of enlargement14.
12Goods
AG agriculture, forestry and shing
OP other primary
FP food processing
IS iron and steel
TX textiles
MH heavy manufacturing
ML light manufacturing
SV services
13Regions*
PLD Poland
HUN Hungary
OCEC Other CEECs (Cz Rep, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria)
UK United Kingdom
GER Germany
OEUN Other EU Northern
OEUS Other EU Southern (Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece)
FSU Former Soviet Union
ODX Other OECD excluding EU and CECs
LDC rest of the world (mostly less developed countries)
*note GTAP version 5 has only 3 CEEC regions.
14Due to data limitations, I am unable to carry out simulations on the precise accession list of 2004. The
other CEEC region comprises the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria. The latter
11
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For trade and protection I use 4 principal data series from GTAP for these countries
and regions:exports at market (i.e. domestic) prices (VXMD), exports at world prices
(VXWD), imports at world prices (VIWS) and imports at market prices (ie sales prices
in the importing country before indirect tax) (VIMS). Trade volumes, transport costs and
tari¤s are derived from these series.15
4 Results
4.1 Border costs
In 1997, imports from the CEECs into the EU faced sizeable barriers in agriculture and food
processing, but formal barriers elsewhere had been removed under the Europe Agreements.
CES weighted averages of the barriers facing CEEC exports to the EU varied between 10
and 31 per cent for agriculture, while for food processing they were 25-54 per cent. Even
after taking account of these formal trade barriers, there is still a considerable shortfall
compared to intra-EU trade.
Table 1 shows calibrated comparative costs and country bias. In this case, average
excessbias on EU-CEEC trade is assumed to be the same in both directions. The rst
column shows calibrated production costs relative to the EU. This suggests the CEECs
two are not on the 2005 EU accession list, whereas the 3 Baltic States, as well as Cyprus and Malta, are.
15VIWS - VXWD is the transport cost margin.
VXWD - VXMD is net export tax/subsidy, plus the GTAP estimates of the tari¤ equivalent of some
quantitative trade restrictions whose revenue accrues to the exporting country.
VIMS - VIWS is net import tax/subsidy and the tari¤ equivalent of remaining NTBs.
Correction is made for some data errors in GTAP V5. I have removed tari¤s on trade between the EU
and CEECs other than in agriculture and food processing.
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are low-cost producers compared to the EU in almost all industries, especially services16,
agriculture, and light and heavy manufactures. Hungary is low-cost in textiles, while the
OCEC region is high-cost in iron and steel.
Table 1 Calibrated relative production prices and iceberg cost
of home/country bias
POLAND Relative Intra-EU EU v Poland Poland v EU
Industry Price Home Bias
AG -0.41 0.68 0.08 0.08
OP -0.21 0.50 0.20 0.20
FP -0.35 0.68 -0.05 -0.05
TEX -0.30 0.55 0.09 0.09
IS -0.01 0.56 0.16 0.16
MH -0.40 0.59 0.14 0.14
ML -0.41 0.53 0.17 0.17
SV -0.38 0.82 0.06 0.06
HUNGARY Relative Intra-EU EU v Hungary Hungary v EU
Industry Price Home Bias
AG -0.35 0.68 0.10 0.10
OP -0.50 0.50 0.33 0.33
FP -0.41 0.68 0.05 0.05
TEX -0.35 0.55 0.06 0.06
IS -0.14 0.56 0.19 0.19
MH -0.45 0.59 0.14 0.14
ML -0.39 0.53 0.09 0.09
SV -0.45 0.82 0.06 0.06
OTHER CEECs Relative Intra-EU EU v OCEC OCEC v EU
Industry price Home bias
AG -0.36 0.68 0.09 0.09
OP -0.16 0.50 0.30 0.30
FP -0.41 0.68 0.06 0.06
TEX -0.20 0.55 0.08 0.08
IS 0.24 0.56 0.13 0.13
MH -0.31 0.59 0.11 0.11
ML -0.34 0.53 0.13 0.13
SV -0.36 0.82 0.04 0.04
The second column is average calibrated home bias between EU states, which is far
from having been eliminated by the Single Market. The remaining two columns show
16Comparative costs in services would, of course, be expected to be lower in poorer countries (see Balassa,
1964). However, it seems that, at least for Poland, the low relative costs apply to all sectors. Only for the
Other CEEC region does there seem to be clear evidence supporting the Balassa-Samuelson relationship.
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average calibrated iceberg costs of trade in both directions on trade between the EU and
CEECs, assuming they are symmetrical 17. These vary from slightly negative (for Polish
food processing only) to around 15% for Polish manufactures, 10-13% for other CEEC
manufactures and 9-14 per cent for Hungarian manufactures. For agriculture they are
around 7-10%. The key assumption is that Single Market entry can remove these costs.
4.2 Enlargement simulations
Table 2 (below) shows the e¤ects on consumer welfare in each region resulting from (1)
customs union (removal of the tari¤s on agriculture and foodstu¤s and harmonisation of
external tari¤s with those of the EU) and (2) assumed abolition of iceberg unspecied
trading costs, i ; when countries join the Single Market. Customs union has only small
welfare e¤ects, though these generally benet the accession states by 0-212% while having
no signicant e¤ect on existing EU members. The former e¤ect is not surprising given the
fact that most tari¤s have already been abolished, while the latter reects the small size of
the CEEC economies relative to the existing EU.
Under (2) the trade between the EU and CEEC is increased to reect the supposed
removal of trade costs following Single Market accession. Since it is assumed these are
real resource costs, all countries can gain, including outsiders. The biggest beneciaries are
the CEEC countries, where welfare rises by 10-20% compared to 1997 base. Gains to the
existing EU members are typically around 12%. Even the poorer EU countries in the South
experience gains of 0.4%, with expansion outweighing the costs of cheap-wage competition.
The Former Soviet Union and LDCs also see small gains, so that trade diversion e¤ects are
17 If costs were asymmetric, then equation (8) would imply that, if border costs were lower in one direction
than in Table 1, they would have to be higher in the other direction.
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outweighed for them by the e¤ects of the overall expansion of the EU and CEEC economies.
Table 2 Summary of results - change on 1997 base,
calculated consumer utility
1.EU-CEC customs union 2. CEEC trade shares shift
in line with intra-EU trade
a) National b) Capital a) National b) Capital
capital mobile captal mobile
stocks xed % internationally % stocks xed % internationally %
Poland 1.9 2.4 15.3 19.4
Hungary 0.2 0.2 14.6 17.6
Other CEC 1.0 1.2 11.5 13.3
UK -0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1
Germany 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.7
Other EU North 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.4
Other EU South 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.4
EU total 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.4
Europe total 0.1 0.1 0.9 1.1
Former Soviet Union 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1
Other OECD 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
LDCs 0.0 -0.0 0.0 0.0
Global total 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.3
Table 3 shows the change in trade volumes: these are typically of the order 50-100%
between the EU countries and CECs on accession.
Table 3 Changes in trade volumes with trade share
shifts and mobile capital assumed
Total trade volumes Before After % change
Poland to EU 4.98 9.12 + 83%
Hungary to EU 2.62 4.34 + 65%
Other CEC to EU 6.05 9.81 + 62%
EU to Poland 1.88 3.77 +100%
EU to Hungary 1.45 2.20 + 51%
EU to Other CEC 3.56 5.50 + 55%
To summarise some further results18 :
1. Output gains are spread widely across all industries in the CEEC region, though
the biggest gains are to agriculture, food products and manufactures. Within the EU there
18Full details and tables are available in Edwards (2004).
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appear to be few losers.
2. Prices in the EU generally fall as a result of the saving in costs of inputs (the unskilled
wage in Germany is set to 1 in this model, to act as a numeraire). However in the CEEC
countries - especially Poland - output prices generally rise towards EU levels.
3. Relative skilled/unskilled wages do not change greatly in any country, though there
are sizeable gains to both types of labour in Poland in particular. The lack of distributional
changes between types of labour may partly be because a xed factor (land) in two sectors
absorbs much of the e¤ects of changes in output prices.19
4.3 Comparison with other studies
4.3.1 Border costs
The calibrated residual border costs vary between 7 and 15 per cent of total cost of goods
traded - which suggest they are roughly twice as large as implied by bottom-upestimates
such as Harrison et al (1996) or Zahariadis, 2002. I suggest this represents a general
discrepancy between gravity models and attempts to quantify the e¤ects of observable
barriers.20 Possible reasons are that di¤erent regulatory regimes involve more inconvenience
and uncertainty to trading rms than simple cost estimates imply, or that there may be
xed costs involved which have not properly been modelled, or alternatively that trade costs
are magnied by the presence of informational barriers (see Edwards, 2006).
19See Edwards and Whalley (2006).
20However, a higher trade elasticity, as suggested by, for example, Harrigan (1993), could reduce the
implicit border costs consistent with a particular observed trade pattern.
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4.3.2 Enlargement simulation results
Baldwin et als work (1997) used a relatively sophisticated D-S formulation, and also in-
corporated estimates of the impact of the Common Agricultural Policy and of structural
and regional assistance, as well as capital mobility. However, for trade barriers they simply
assumed a 10% across-the-board iceberg cost (which exceeds bottom-up estimates, but is
smaller than the implicit costs for many sectors in this study), as well as a capital risk pre-
mium. The LeJour et al study (2001) applies a detailed (but not strictly model-consistent)
gravity model estimation to a more conventional Armington multi-country CGE model.
The two previous studies both found signicant welfare and trade gains from EU en-
largement. Baldwin et als (1997) simulation results, based on an assumed 10% iceberg
cost on trade between the EU and CEECs, are shown in Table 4 (below). Le Jour et al
(2001) also nd substantial benets for the accession countries, particularly Poland, though
not as sizeable as in Baldwin et al (1997). This is not surprising since the former use an
Armington model, which does not model all the benets which a D-S model captures. Both
studies agreed that enlargement involves few costs for existing EU members, though LeJour
et al (2001) imply France may have lost slightly. The study in this paper nds GDP gains
to Poland of around 20% of GDP, to Hungary of nearly 18% and just over 13% for the other
CEEC countries, with small gains for the existing EU countries. These estimates exceed
those in LeJour et al (2001), but are roughly in line with Baldwin et als (1997) gures.
The di¤erence may largely reect the greater gains from trade in a Dixit-Stiglitz compared
to an Armington framework, with signicant pro-competitive and variety gains to utility.
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Table 4: Comparison with other studies. Real income per cent change
Baldwin et al LeJour et al
1997 2001
Conservative Less conservative Custom union Single market entry
CEEC7 2.5 18.8 1.3 5.3
EU15 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.1
EFTA 3 0.1 0.1 N/A N/A
Other OECD N/A N/A 0.0 0.0
Former Sov Union 0.3 0.6 0.0 0.0
4.4 Comparison with actual experience: the case of Poland.
Direct comparison of the counterfactual simulations of a comparative static model with
actual country experience is not simple. Accession to the EU Single Market is a lengthy
process, requiring adaptation of trade barriers, laws, standards and macroeconomic policies
over a number of years, as well as adjustment by rms and consumers. Consequently, even
though the o¢ cial EU accession date for the Poland was 2005, it is by no means easy to
establish precisely when adjustment began or will end. In the meantime, global prices and
technology have changed, while the CEECs are also readjusting to a market economy and a
more transparent political system - a process assisted by, but not entirely dependent upon
EU accession.
Looking at the period between 1997 and 2004 (just prior to o¢ cial accession), Polands
GDP grew by around 29% (or 3.7% per annum)21, much faster than the Eurozone as a
whole. According to the Polish Ministry of Economic A¤airs and Labour, Polands exports
more than doubled, rising as from 20% to 33.7% of GDP,22 with the growth being spread
widely across commodities (as our model would indicate). Imports grew less rapidly in
percentage terms. The EU accounted for 78% of Polands exports and 68% of imports in
21Source: Polish National Statistical O¢ ce, http://www.stat.gov.pl./dane_spol-
gosp/nanse_pod_gosp/Rachunki_kwartalne_pkb_latach_1995-2004/tabela38.xls.
22Polish Ministry of Economic A¤airs and Labour: Poland 2005. Report-Foreign Trade. Table 3 and
Charts 3-4.
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2004.
A tentative conclusion would be that the 80-100% surge in Polish-EU trade predicted
by the model has e¤ectively happened in anticipation of accession (2004 saw particularly
rapid trade growth).23 The timing of this surge should not be seen as surprising, given
that formal trade barriers (except in agriculture and food products) were removed in the
mid-1990s, while implementation of the various EU regulations and standards has been
a gradual process. The degree to which Polands rapid GDP growth can be attributed to
rising trade with the EU would require much more detailed study: if one assumes that there
are up-front costs in changing a countrys regulatory regime, and that developing products
and market ties to new countries also involves search and learning-by-doing,24 then, the
long-run welfare gains could take longer to emerge than the increase in trade.
5 Summary and Conclusions
This paper addresses the potential benets of deeper integration of the CEECs into the EUs
Single Market, associated with the 2005 accession. I assume that di¤erent regulatory and
currency regimes pose a signicant barrier to trade, proxied by an iceberg-type border cost,
whose removal is potentially relatively cheap. Such barriers are estimated by comparing the
trade volumes between countries which are already members of the Single Market in 1997
with those which were not. This involves assumptions about the nature and specication
of the barriers imposed by di¤erent regulatory regimes, and the underlying structure of
the economy. With these assumptions, and using a Dixit-Stiglitz type general equilibrium
23Some of the trade growth observed would, of course, reect underlying steady-state economic growth.
24Rauchs (1999) work on networks and trade, in particular, would indicate this kind of learning process
is involved.
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structure, I calibrate directly for implicit trade costs - so avoiding the questions of model
consistency which apply to previous work.
Based upon this approach, trade between the EU and accession states in 1997 fell well
short of its potential, as judged by inter-EU trade patterns. Consequently, entry to the
Single Market could be seen as potentially raising trade between the accession states and
existing EU by 50-100 % compared to 1997, with trade between Poland and the EU rising
particularly fast. Unlike purely gravity-based studies, the general equilibrium approach in
this paper is able to derive estimates of associated GDP gains: for the EUs new members
from Central and Eastern Europe, these are of the order of 13-20 per cent from entry into
the Single Market and abolition of remaining tari¤ barriers. I do not look at the e¤ects of
agricultural or regional subsidies. These cost estimates are somewhat larger than those of Le
Jour et als (2001) model, which included fewer competitive and variety e¤ects. Hence, the
study can be viewed as giving a bullish interpretation of the trade e¤ects of deep integration
of the accession states, although some other potential benets from institutional reforms
are omitted.25
A quick comparison with Polands actual experience since 1997 that the sizeable increase
in predicted trade has largely taken place in the years prior to actual accession. However,
there may be ongoing welfare benets as rms and consumers adjust to membership.
25On this point, Piazolos (2001, Chapter D) estimates suggest that an improvement in institutional quality
by one third, as measured by the EBRD index, would increase the level of GDP by at least one tenth purely
due to the greater e¢ ciency of resource use estimate with our CGE model. The total increase in GDP in
some of the institutionally more backward states, allowing for additional investment over time, could be 20
to 30 percent.
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Appendix 1: General equilibrium model (GEMEE).
Notes on the structure of the model:
The model is based on an imperfectly competitive structure, using a Dixit-Stiglitz frame-
work.26 In this paper I have used the simpler version of the model, where the number of
goods produced within each country, c, and industry, i, nc;i, is xed. Each good is pro-
duced by one rm and denoted g. However, unlike many Armington models, it does allow
for monopolistic markups. I also allow capital to ow between countries.
Production of goods.
Each rm combines labour, land and capital using a Cobb-Douglas function to form a
value added input: i.e.
V Ag = c;i(LU
uc;i
g LS
sc;i
g )
(1 kc;i dc;i)Kkc;ig Dgdc;i ; (A1)
where V A is value added (quantity), K is capital, D is land which is sectorally xed. ; k
and d are scale and share parameters. Labour is a Cobb-Douglas aggregate of unskilled
labour, LU , and skilled labour, LS, u and s are share parameters.
All rms g within i in a given country, c, are identical. I normalise c;i = 1. In
equilibrium,
26Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).
24
Page 24 of 32
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
LUc;i = V Ac;iPVc;iuc;i(1  kc;i   dci)=WUc; (A2)
LSc;i = V Ac;iPVc;isc;i(1  kc;i   dc;i)=WSc;
Kc;i = V Ac;iPVc;ikc;i=Rc;i;
Dc;i = V Ac;iPVc;idc;i=LDPc;i;
where WU , WS;R and LDP are factor rents.
The price of value added,
PVc;i = (WUcLUc;i +WScLSc;i +RcKc;i + LDPc;iDc;i)=V Ac;i: (A3)
Higher level of production function.
Output of i, Yc;i, is a Cobb-Douglas aggregate of intermediate inputs II of other goods,
ii; and value added, V A:
Yc;i = 
c;iV A
vc;i
c;i
Y
ii
II
Ic;ii;i
c;ii;i : (A4)
Assuming cost-minimisation, with PU and PY denoting input and output prices,
IIc;ii;i = Ic;iYc;iPYc;i=PUc;ii;i; and (A5)
V Ac;i = vc;iYc;iPYc;i=PVc;i: (A6)
Marginal cost, PPY , is easily calculated from the cost of inputs per unit output:
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PPYc;ii = (V Ac;iiPVc;ii +
X
i
IIc;i;iiPUc;i)=Yc;ii: (A7)
The marginal per unit price including tax and subsidies:
PYc;ii = PPYc;ii(1 +OUTTAXc;ii)  SUBSIDYc;ii=Yc;ii: (A8)
Trade and the aggregation of goods.
I use a two-stage nested utility function. Total demand for industry bundle i in c is a
Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate TUc;i:
TUc;i =
0@X
g2i
g;cU

g;c
1A1= ; (A9)
where Ug;c is use of g in c and  is a parameter reecting compatibility and home bias
in consumption. The substitution parameter  = (   1)=, where  is the elasticity of
substitution between g in i.
If  depends only on country of origin, cc, country of use, c, and industry, i, then we
sum, rst, the various varieties g 2 (cc \ i); produced in each country cc, and then sum
across countries:
TUc;i =
0@X
cc
X
g2(cc\i)
cc;c;iU

g;c;i
1A1= : (A10)
If all rms within an industry/country are identical in size, then we can write
TUcc;i =
 X
c
ncii;c;cc (QUi;c;cc=nc;i)

!1=
: (A11)
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Total expenditure in country cc on goods in industry i:
V Ucc;i =
X
c
QUi;c;ccPUUi;c;cc: (A12)
The price PU of the aggregate bundle TU :
PUcc;i = V Ucc;i=TUcc;i: (A13)
Consumption (top level of the nested utility function).
Utility UT is a Cobb-Douglas aggregate across i of consumption CNi :
UTc =
Y
i
CN
ci;c
i;c : (A14)
CNi;c = ci;cCEc=PUc;i: (A15)
Competition and pricing.
Within export markets, it is assumed that a rm has a very small market share and so
its own-price elasticity is . By contrast, in the home market, the rms market share Sg;c
is assumed to be signicant, so the rms price elasticity
hc;i =  + (1=nc;i)(1  SMc;i)(1  ); (A16)
where, if HU denotes consumption from domestic suppliers and PTi;c;cc is the selling price,
SMc;i = 1 HUc;iPTi;c;c=V Uc;i: (A17)
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The overall own price elasticity is a weighted average from home and export markets:
oc;i = hc;i(HUc;i=Yc;i) + (Yc;i  HUc;i=Yc;i): (A18)
Monopolistic competition markups: the rm marks up production costs by a pro-
portion
MMc;i = 1=(1  (1=oc;i))  1: (A19)
The price of good g including monopoly markups is therefore:
PMc;i = PYc;i(1 +MMc;i): (A20)
Transport costs
Transport costs are proportional to value, so the price including transport,
PTRi;c;cc = PMc;i(1 + Tmarginci;c;cc): (A21)
This is an iceberg cost, so, if Xi;c;cc is the quantity of i leaving country c for country cc,
the amount which arrives in country cc is:
Mi;c;cc = Xi;c;cc=(1 + Tmargini;c;cc): (A22)
Tari¤s
Tari¤s are expressed as a percentage rate, so the price including tari¤s is
PTi;c;cc = PTRi;c;cc(1 + tariffi;c;cc=100): (A23)
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The consumer price, PUUi;c;cc, also includes a proportional tax on use:
PUUi;c;cc = PTi;c;cc(1 + USETAXcc;i): (A24)
Exports
Consumption (nal and intermediate) in country cc of good i produced in country c is
QUi;c;cc = fXi;c;cc=(1 + Tmargini;c;cc) if cc 6= c or HUi;c if cc = cg: (A25)
Sales shares
QUi;c;cc = TUcc;inc;i(i;c;ccPUUi;c;cc=PUcc;i)
1=(1 ): (A26)
Aggregate consumer price
The total value of expenditure on good i in country c is
V Ucc;i =
X
c
QUi;c;ccPUUi;c;cc: (A27)
Factor markets
Both types of labour are immobile between countries, but mobile between industries.
The wage clears each labour market, so that
LU c =
X
i
LUc;i;
LSc =
X
i
LSc;i: (A28)
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Capital is fully mobile between industries, and may or not be mobile between countries:
Kc +KMc =
X
i
Kic;i: (A29)
Where KMc is non-zero (so that there are international transfers of capital) the global
total of KM is set to zero. X
c
KMc = 0: (A30)
The rate of return on capital in each industry is equated to the national rate of return,
RBc:
Rc;i = RBc: (A31)
Where capital is allowed to move internationally,
RBc = RBODX : (A32)
Land is sectorally immobile, so
LDc;i = LDc;i: (A33)
Variety of goods
For sensitivity analysis, the xed rm numbers version of the model assumes the total
number of rms in each country is xed:
nc;i = nc;i: (A34)
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National accounts
Home use of goods, HUc;i,equals total production less exports:
HUc;i = Yc;i  
X
cc
Xi;c;cc: (A35)
Total use of good i in country c produced in country cc equals home use, where c = cc.
Otherwise it equals imports.
Use tax is an ad valorem tax on all use of i in country c, giving revenue
TUYc =
 X
i
HUc;iPTi;cc +
 X
cc
PTi;cc;cEXi;cc;c=(1 + tmargini;cc;c)
!!
(1 + u setaxc;i):
(A36)
Output tax, OT, is a tax per unit value of output of an industry above.
Total consumer expenditure in country c;
CEc =
X
i
V Ac;iPVc;i +
X
i
Yc;iPYc;iMMc;i
+
X
cc
X
i
(EXi;cc;cPMcc;iTRi;cc;c)=100)
+
X
i
OTc;i
 
V Ac;iPWc;i +
X
ii
IIc;ii;iPUc;ii
!
+TUYc   TSUBYc  BOTc  KMcRBc: (A37)
The Balance of Trade, BOTc, (including long-term net capital payments) is xed:
BOTc =
X
i
X
cc
EXi;c;ccPMc;i  
X
cc
EXi;cc;cPMcc;i  KMcRBc: (A38)
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Key assumed parameter values: Demand side:
The top level utility function is Cobb-Douglas in functional form (so the elasticity of
substitution between consumption of the produce of each industry, i, is unity). Share
parameters for each product class are calibrated from value shares in total expenditure.
The lower level utility function has an elasticity of substitution between goods g in
industry i of : This is assumed to equal 4 in all industries.
Supply side: technology is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas, so elasticities of substitution
between inputs are unity, and share parameters can be directly calibrated from total costs
(once monopoly prot has been subtracted). Firm sizes are equal within each industry
across countries. Iron and Steel and Heavy Manufacture are seen as the least competitive
industries (1 and 3 rms respectiv ly in our smallest region, Hungary), followed by Other
Primary, Light Manufacturing, Textiles and Food Processing (4-6 rms per industry in
Hungary). Services and agriculture have much smaller rm sizes.
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